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The Claim 
It doesn’t matter who your players are – if they train hard enough and long 
enough they can play at the highest level! 
 
 
Origins 
In 1993, Anders Ericsson, Ralf Krampe and Clemens Tesch-Römer published ‘The Role of Deliberate 
Practice in the Acquisition of Expert Performance’ (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993).   
Their article proposes that expert performance i.e. the ability of an individual to perform at the 
highest level (for example, a footballer playing in the Premier League, the Champions League, or at 
international level), has little to do with heritable (‘innate’/’natural’) ability, but is highly dependent 
on the quantity and quality of practice in their chosen field or domain (e.g. football, a particular 
position in football).  Specifically, a minimum of 10 years, or 10,000 hours, of deliberate practice.  
Deliberate practice (as shall be show) is a very specific and demanding form engagement in the skills 
and tasks of the domain. 
 
In the period since the 1993 work, Ericsson and (various) colleagues have researched and developed 
these ideas considerably.  There are now innumerably books, journal articles and press reports 
including, notably, ‘The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance’ (Ericsson, 
Charness, Feltovich, & Hoffman, 2006) and ‘Expert Performance in Sport: Recent Advances in 
Research on Sport Expertise’ (Starkes & Ericsson, 2003) (see reading list and references at the end of 
the document). 
As might be expected given the simplicity and empowering nature of their claims, Ericsson and 
colleagues’ ideas have been taken up in the popular scientific literature – notably Daniel Coyle’s 
‘Talent Code’, Geoff Colvin’s ‘Talent is Overrated’, Malcolm Gladwell’s ‘Outliers’, and Matthew 
Syed’s ‘Bounce’.  Inevitably, notions of the ‘10,000 hours rule’ and ‘deliberate practice’ have entered 
into the Football Association’s and Premier League’s thinking – notably through ‘The Future Game’ 
publication, and the ‘Elite Player Performance Plan’1 
This research briefing provides an overview of Ericsson and colleagues’ ideas, the supportive and 
critical evidence, and makes some suggestions about what it means for coaches. 
 
  
                                                          
1
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/paulfletcher/2011/02/football_league_fears_over_pla.html 
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Who is an expert? What is expertise? 
Before we consider Ericsson and colleagues’ views on the conditions and factors which enable 
expertise to develop it is important to consider the questions – ‘who is an expert?’, and ‘what is 
expertise?’ – because, as will become clear, the  definitions adopted have a significant bearing on 
the way in which the phenomenon  is described, and the recommendations for action. 
Historically, there have been different notions about who is an expert, what expertise is, and how 
expertise is developed.  One commonly held view is that an expert is “someone widely recognised as 
a reliable source of knowledge, technique or skill, whose judgement is accorded authority and status 
by the public or his or her peers” (Wikipedia, 2005).  Expertise then refers to the characteristics, 
skills, and knowledge that distinguish experts from novices and less experienced people according to 
general and peer assessment.  
Another common perception is that talent is hereditary (‘innate’, ‘natural’, ‘born’) which derives, it is 
frequently argued, from Francis Galton’s 1896 study ‘Hereditary Genius’ (Galton, 1896/1979) – but 
may also be a common sense everyday perception of, for example, parents and coaches.  Thus, 
when pundits and supporters talk about Wayne Rooney, for example, they suggest ‘he’s got natural 
talent’, that is, an hereditary gift he was born with.  Another commonly held perception is that 
experts have prolonged or intense experience in their domain through practice and education.   
 
Question Box 
Think about the players you have worked with. 
How do you assess whether a player is high performing/expert?  What markers do you use? 
Which factors are most important in determining playing success – hereditary factors such as 
‘natural ability’, or environmental factors such as ‘training and working hard’, ‘good coaching’ and 
‘supportive parents’? 
 
These common views on expertise, however, have been challenged by Ericsson and colleagues.   
 When high profile members of a domain are asked to identify their ‘expert peers’, for example, 
the ‘coaches’ coach of the year’, the ‘experts’ identified often do not perform well when asked 
to work on specific tasks compared with novices 
 There is no evidence, it is argued, of hereditary characteristics as a predictor of future expertise.  
For example, there is no correlation between IQ and expert performance in fields such as chess, 
music, sports, and medicine.  The exception is height and body size which can be significant in 
some sports 
 Furthermore, extensive professional experience, it is argued, is not a guarantee of expert 
performance 
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Expertise: Consistently Superior Reproducible Measurable 
Performance 
 
To address the issues identified in the previous section Ericsson and colleagues developed a very 
specific notion of expertise. 
 
First, expert performance produces concrete results.  Brain surgeons, for example, must not only be 
skilful with their scalpels but must also produce successful outcomes with their patients. A chess 
player must be able to win matches in tournaments.   
 
Second, expert performance is consistently superior to that of their peers. 
 
Ericsson and colleagues main contribution has been, however, to emphasise the objective 
measurement of expertise.  Given the problems with peer assessment identified above, an expert 
can only be defined as such if the performance and its outputs can be objectively measured in 
laboratory conditions.  Ericsson commonly cites Lord Kelvin: “If you cannot measure it, you cannot 
improve it.” 
In some domains it is relatively straightforward to objectively identify those who consistently 
produce measurable superior performance.  For example, it is relatively easy to determine who is 
‘expert’ at 100m sprint in the early years of the 2 10s  (Usain Bolt).  But who are the best teachers or 
coaches, for example?  How do you measure their performance without relying on performance 
measures which are highly influenced by the actions of others e.g. students/players?   
Ericsson and colleagues address this problem by suggesting that a domain – irrespective of its 
complexities - can be ‘captured’ using representative simulated tasks in the laboratory which, it is 
argued, mirror real life practice.  This can work, for example, for business leaders, artists etc. 
 
 
Key Point 
 
General conceptions of expertise based on peer recognition and years of experience are challenged 
by Ericsson and colleagues.  To be an expert, they argue, the individual has to consistently perform 
in relation to objective measurable tasks in a laboratory setting 
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The Key to Expert Performance:  
10,000 Hours of Deliberate Practice 
Studies of high performance and expertise have – up until, and including the work of Ericsson and 
colleagues – consistently identified the quantity of experience or practice in a domain as a 
determining factor: 
 
 In their study of chess, Simon and Chase (1973) suggested that expert players acquire knowledge 
of patterns of play through experience, and that they require knowledge of about 50,000 
patterns (or chunks) to reach grandmaster status.  This takes about 10 years to achieve. 
 In a study of 120 elite performers who had won international competitions or awards in fields 
ranging from music, the arts, sport, mathematics and neurology, Bloom (1985) suggested that 
extensive practice was a common feature of their accounts (as well as devoted teachers, and 
enthusiastic families). 
 
As noted earlier, however, for Ericsson and colleague simply experiencing a domain for extended 
periods does not guarantee expert performance (Ericsson, et al., 1993).   They cite evidence from 
‘wine tasting experts’, academia (physics professors), clinical psychologists, and stock brokers 
(Ericsson, 2006; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Ericsson & Towne, 2010)!  For example, wine tasting 
experts were unable to tell the difference between French and US wines, and performed no better 
than novices. 
 
Experience, they suggest - for example, observing others, trial and error - provides performance 
improvements in the initial phases of learning (in what they call the cognitive/associative phases (for 
more details see Fitts & Posner, 1967)) up to the point where the individual becomes competent or 
proficient (‘Everyday Skills’ (Chart 1)).   This, they suggest, usually takes about 50 hours. 
 
Chart 1 – The Relationship Between Experience and Performance Against Specific Practice Types 
(source: Ericsson (2006)). 
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However, after these initial phases of learning the individual begins to automatize relevant skills and 
tasks.  Individuals reach a stable plateau and are no longer conscious of the way they execute 
particular skills.  Thus, they find it difficult to make intentional modifications and adjustments to 
performance.  When these individuals practice, they focus on the things they already do well, rather 
than the things they need to improve. 
 
To address issues associated with the automaticity of skill development through experience (and to 
achieve ‘Expert Performance’ (Chart 1)), Ericsson and colleagues suggest aspiring performers need to 
undertake and experience specific practice conditions known as deliberate practice.  Deliberate 
practice requires considerable, specific and sustained concentration and effort on maintaining the 
knowledge and skills that the aspiring performer does well, but also improving and refining those 
elements that are not done well.   
 
 
Deliberate Practice – The Key Characteristics 
 
 Goal directed activities (that are highly relevant to performance) 
 Active/mindful/effortful/sustained concentration and attention 
 Focuses on weaknesses 
 Appropriate feedback from self (through observation/comparison) or high quality coach or 
mentor (challenging, critical, perhaps even painful) 
 Appropriate opportunities for repetition and correction of errors 
 Finds new ways to undertake the task 
 Structured/measurable 
 Not inherently enjoyable/motivating 
 Does not lead to immediate social or financial rewards 
 Not work or play – focused learning, refining old methods 
 Starts at an early age (if player wants to compete and perform at the highest level) 
Changes 
The key characteristics of deliberate practice appear to have changed over the years.  Ericsson and 
colleague initially emphasised the self-directed and solitary nature of deliberate practice (with 
particular reference to expertise development in music).  In more recent years, the role of team 
training, and the coach/mentor as a provider of challenging critical feedback, has become more 
prominent in their thinking. 
Furthermore, Ericson and colleagues appear to have softened the extent to which deliberate 
practice needs to be inherently un-enjoyable in a sporting context (with reference to Côté and Hay’s 
(2002) work on ‘deliberate play’).  
 
Ericsson et al. (1993) suggest that if individuals engage in deliberate practice “the amount of time 
[engaged] … will be monotonically (in a straight line) related to that individual’s acquired 
performance” (p.728).  This means, as Helson, Hodges, Winckel, & Starkes  (2000, p. 728) suggest, 
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“barring accident or injury …  the more practice the better”.    There are no genetic or other limits on 
performance improvements – it is all down to the amount of deliberate practice. 
 
Since deliberate practice involves such a profound attention to skill maintenance and improvement 
by individuals there is only so much that can be achieved in one day.  For example, Ericsson suggests 
that expert athletes, novelists, and musicians generally find it difficult to concentrate for more than 
four or five hours at one time (musicians generally practice in 80 minute bursts).  Many expert 
teachers and scientists set aside a couple of hours a day – typically in the morning – for their most 
demanding mental activities such as writing about new ideas.  Thus, deliberate practice not only 
requires focused involvement but also adequate periods of recovery to prevent physical and 
psychological staleness and burnout.  The amounts per day may seem small but – 2 hours per day 
deliberate practice – leads to an additional 7,000 hours over a decade. 
 
 
Quote 
 
“The journey to truly superior performance is neither for the faint of heart nor for the impatient.  
The development of genuine expertise requires struggle, sacrifice, and honest, often painful self-
assessment.  There are no shortcuts.  It will take you at least a decade to achieve expertise, and you 
will need to invest that time wisely, by engaging in “deliberate” practice – practice that focuses on 
tasks beyond your current level of competence and comfort.  You will need a well-informed coach 
not only to guide you through deliberate practice but also to help you learn how to coach yourself” 
(Ericsson, 2007, p. 116) 
 
 
Mediating (Cognitive) Mechanisms 
As cognitive psychologists, Ericsson and colleagues generally emphasise the cognitive facets of 
expertise and expertise development e.g. individual level analysis with a specific focus on cognitive 
characteristics and function, rather than individual level analysis of physical components, or 
collective level analysis of social components. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the acquisition, storage and retrieval of domain specific knowledge.  
For example, as Williams and Ward  (2003, p. 221) suggest “the expert’s perceptual superiority over 
the novice is due to enhanced sport-specific cognitive knowledge structures acquired through years 
of deliberate, purposeful practice”. 
Cognitive mechanisms which underpin expert performance include: 
 complex and rich encoding mechanisms 
 complex and sophisticated representations of domain specific situations (Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 
1982) 
 interpretation of greater meaning from available information 
 more effective storage and access to information 
 superior memory performance (notably retrieval from Long Term Working Memory) 
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 reading the field /superior anticipation skills (not necessarily speed/response times)  
 use situational probability data better 
 make decisions that are more rapid and more appropriate 
Overviews of the evidence supporting the central role of cognitive mechanisms in expertise 
development are provided by Ericsson & Smith (1991) and Ericsson & Towne (2010).  See Williams 
and Ward (2003) for an overview in sport. 
 
Evaluating the Evidence 
 
Ericsson and colleagues make a number of key claims about expertise and its development: 
 
 Expertise can be captured through questionnaires/diaries and/or representative tasks in 
laboratory conditions 
 Expertise is domain specific - the characteristics of expertise do not transfer (easily) between 
domains 
 Expertise is largely mediated through cognitive mechanisms (rather than through physical or 
social mechanisms, for example) 
 Expert performance has little connection with hereditary ‘gifts’ or ‘talents’ – ‘experts are not 
born, they are made’ (Ericsson, 2007) 
 The development of expertise requires an extended period of ‘deliberate practice’ – over 10 
years, or 10,000 hours 
 Practice should focus on goal directed domain specific activities that are highly relevant to 
performance/focus on weaknesses 
 Practice should be active/effortful/mindful/sustained concentration and attention; it is not 
inherently enjoyable/motivating; and does not lead to immediate social or financial rewards 
 Practice should involve appropriate feedback from self (through observation/comparison) or 
high quality coach or mentor (challenging, critical, perhaps even painful); and opportunities for 
corrective adjustment 
 Since performance peaks at particular ages – 20s, 30s, 40s – some domains require very early 
focused engagement including  volume and intensity of specialised training, opportunities to 
engage in elite development structures, with access to superior training resources and 
supportive environments. 
 
The following tables present evidence for and against these claims. 
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Key Features of the 10,000 Hour Rule and Deliberate Practice: The Evidence 
Feature Supportive Evidence Critical Evidence Commentary 
Expertise can be captured through 
questionnaires/diaries and/or 
representative tasks in laboratory 
conditions 
 
“The virtue of defining expert performance in 
this restricted sense is that the definition 
both meets all the requirements for carrying 
out laboratory studies of performance and 
comes close to meeting those for evaluating 
performance in many domains.  At the same 
time it excludes those domains where 
investigators have been unable to supply a 
valid measure with associated 
demonstrations of superior performance” 
(Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996, p. 277) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ericsson and colleagues have 
proposed/used two basic approaches 
for understanding the characteristics 
and development of expertise (1) 
questionnaires/diaries/retrospective 
interviews with experts and novices to 
identify differences in development 
profiles and histories (e.g. Ericsson, et 
al., 1993) (2) the ‘expert performance 
approach’ which seeks to capture 
expertise through objective 
representative tasks/situations in 
laboratory conditions (Ericsson & Smith, 
1991) 
 There have been numerous examples of 
questionnaire/retrospective interview 
approaches in sport and football and 
these have provided interesting insight 
into practice histories (e.g. Helsen, 
Starkes, & Hodges, 1998; Hodges & 
Starkes, 1996; Starkes, Deakin, Allard, 
Hodges, & Hayes, 1996; Ward, Hodges, 
Starkes, Williams, & 153., 2007) 
 There have been fewer examples of the 
application of the expert performance 
approach in sport outside the 
pioneering studies which proceeded it, 
for example, de Groot in chess (de 
Groot, 1978).   There have, however, 
been an increasing number of studies 
which make detailed assessment of 
expert skills, and compare these with 
practice profiles and histories.  For 
example, Weissenteiner, Abernethy, 
Farrow, & Müller (2008) examined 
cricketers anticipation skills against 
 The questionnaires/diaries 
methodology has been criticised for its 
inability to distinguish between practice 
activities (the micro-structure of 
practice) – thus all practice has 
generally been coded as deliberate 
practice. For example, play, practice, 
competition, solitary, team based, and 
coach facilitated activities have all been 
coded the same (Baker, Côté, & Deakin, 
2005; Cobley & Baker, 2010; Helsen, et 
al., 1998; Ward, et al., 2007)   
 Retrospective studies analysing 
performers’ practice histories have also 
be criticised for lacking in accuracy (e.g. 
Abernethy, Farrow, & Berry, 2003; 
Deakin & Cobley, 2003; Hodge & 
Deakin, 1998) 
 The expert performance approach has 
been criticised for assuming that 
complex tasks can be adequately 
captured in laboratory settings 
(Abernethy, et al., 2003), and more 
generally (Archer, 1998; Wachtel, 1973) 
 The expert performance approach is 
simply not sensitive enough to domain 
structure, complexity and variability, the 
way in which different practice types 
and other features lead to expert 
performance.   For example, deliberate 
practice may work as an explanatory 
framework in simpler structured 
domains such as music, chess and golf, 
it may not work for more complex and 
variable domains as football and hockey 
(Cobley & Baker, 2010). 
 Ericsson and colleagues adopt a model 
of science which emphasises the 
objective measurement of expertise 
components, mediating mechanisms 
and developmental histories 
 Though still a mainstream position in 
cognitive psychology, this model of 
science has been increasingly criticised 
in the philosophy of science for over-
simplification, over-confidence with 
particular regard to views on the 
structure of the social world, causality, 
and how we can develop knowledge 
claims (e.g. Sayer, 2000) .  As Crust 
(2010) suggests it provides a ‘surface’ or 
‘obvious’ explanation 
 For example, the ‘expert performance 
approach’ suggests that expertise and 
the ability to capture expertise through 
chosen method are synonymous! The 
approach suggests the reduction of 
domain to representative tasks in 
laboratory conditions against which 
individuals will excel or otherwise.  
Thus, the definition of expertise is 
reliant on the tasks capturing the 
domain.  This may work in some 
domains e.g. chess but it very 
dangerous assumption in others e.g. in 
football and in coaching! 
 By adopting this model – we get a very 
narrow conception of domains, domain 
performance, and latitude for expertise 
within this context.  Domains are 
treated as if they are highly structured, 
inherently predictable, and that 
9 
 
Feature Supportive Evidence Critical Evidence Commentary 
Expertise can be captured through 
questionnaires/diaries and/or 
representative tasks in laboratory 
conditions (continued)… 
 
practice hours.  Ford, Low, McRobert, & 
Williams  (2010) examined cricketers 
anticipation skills against practice type. 
Williams, Ward, Bell-Walker, & Ford  
(2011) examined footballers perceptual-
cognitive expertise against practice 
history 
 
 Definitions of expertise in relation to 
the domain need to be carefully 
considered.  Some domains are less 
structured and therefore encourage 
more latitude for creative solutions (e.g. 
Memmert, Baker, & Bertsch, 2010)  
 Abernethy, Farrow, & Berry (2003) 
suggest that there may be considerable 
variations in the underlying mediating 
physical and cognitive mechanisms in 
relation to the same task in experts.  
Thus assumptions that expertise is 
structured and consistent maybe 
misleading 
 Abernethy et al. (1993) draw on 
dynamical systems theory (e.g. Haken, 
Kelso, & Bunz, 1985) to argue that the 
understanding of expertise is less 
informed by stabilities in practice 
structures than instabilities “the cusps 
between the emergence of different 
types of dominant movement patterns” 
(p.354) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
outcomes are at the control of 
individuals – but we know this is often 
not the case – notably in coaching 
 This scientific approach, it methods and 
conclusions about expertise, also have a 
direct impact on ideas about 
developmental influences i.e. practice.  
Accounts of deliberate practice fail to 
take into account variations in practice 
with relation to specific development 
goals, contextual factors, and micro 
spatial/temporal variation 
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Feature Supportive Evidence Critical Evidence Commentary 
Expertise is domain specific - the 
characteristics of expertise do not 
transfer (easily) between domains 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ericsson et al. (1993) suggest the 
general ‘abilities’ e.g. IQ/positive scores 
on psychometric tests may have a 
positive impact on the early stages of 
development in a domain, but that 
there is no strong evidence of their long 
term influence on expert performance – 
this comes from extensive 
experience/practice within the domain 
 Newell & Rosenbloom (1981) suggest 
early diversification is beneficial to 
children when they are learning a new 
skills/activities because of 
improvements to general capabilities 
(e.g. fundamental movement skills).  
However, once these general 
adaptations have been made training 
adaptations become much more specific 
in nature and difficult to attain.  At this 
time training should become more 
specific and deliberate 
 Baker, Côté, & Deakin (2005) found that 
diversified training was valuable only 
during the early phases of development 
in ultra-endurance triathletes 
 Baker & Côté (2006) suggest that the 
ancillary benefits of early diversification 
are best achieved in sports with very 
similar information processing and 
physical demands 
 Foster et al. (1995) suggests that cross-
training – for example, using swimming 
to improve running performance – has 
benefits but not as much as specific 
domain training 
 Allard & Starkes (1991) suggests 
cognitive skills such as pattern 
recognition are non-transferable and 
domain specific 
 Baker, Cobley, & Fraser-Thomas (2009) 
suggest the transfer of knowledge and 
skills between domains has been 
identified in sports with similar 
structures, and in cross training where 
there are similar modes of activity 
 For example, Smeeton, Ward, & 
Williams  (2004) suggest that football 
and hockey players were able to 
recognise attacking situations in their 
respective sports; volleyball players less 
so 
 Abernethy, Baker, & Côté (2005) 
suggest expert netball, hockey and 
basketball players more accurately 
recalled plays from their own and other 
sports than novices in their own and 
other sports 
 Berry, Abernethy, & Côté (2008) suggest 
that developmental experiences in a 
range of invasion sports conferred 
benefits in terms of decision making in 
AFL players 
 Flynn et al. (1998) and Mutton et al. 
(1993) suggest benefits from cross-
training which involve activities that 
share similar muscle groups (e.g. 
running and cycling) 
 Excessive domain specialisation can 
undermine creative development 
(Memmert, et al., 2010). 
 
 On the evidence presented it is difficult 
to reach firm conclusions.  For example,  
Baker et al. (2009) suggest the evidence 
on transfer of knowledge and skills 
across domains is contradictory, 
inconclusive and suggest further 
research is required.   
 If we are drawn to a conclusion it is that 
highly structured domains, with fewer 
active ingredients, and degrees of 
freedom, probably benefit less from 
cross domain experiences, where as 
more complex and dynamic domains 
benefit more.  For example, extensive 
single domain preparation might be 
appropriate in chess, but other 
domains, for example, coaching would 
undoubtedly benefit from exposure to 
other areas of life such as experiences 
of being a parent 
 There also appears to be benefits of 
early diversification to support the 
development of general movement 
skills, and on-going diversification to 
support creativity 
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Feature Supportive Evidence Critical Evidence Commentary 
Expertise is domain specific - the 
characteristics of expertise do not 
transfer (easily) between domains 
(continued)… 
 Motor behaviour research has not 
supported the assumption that 
individual performance on one task can 
predict performance in another, even 
when the task appear to rely on the 
same basic ability (Schmidt, 1983) 
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Feature Supportive Evidence Critical Evidence Commentary 
Expertise is largely mediated 
through cognitive mechanisms 
(rather than physical or social, for 
example) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 There is significant evidence for the 
importance of psychological 
mechanisms in expert performance 
(Orlick & Partington, 1988; Smith, 1995) 
 Player performance is determined by 
multiple attributes (and not just 
perceptual and decision making skills) 
(Berry, et al., 2008) 
 For example, player performance is 
facilitated by physical mechanisms 
(Keogh, 1999; Pyne, Gardner, Sheehan, 
& Hopkins, 2005) 
 Social factors are clearly important to 
expertise development (Bloom, 1985; 
Carlson, 1988) 
 As with other models of expertise (and 
talent) development (e.g. Gagné, 2003) 
we suggest the expertise is the product 
of multiple converging factors – 
heritable, environmental, physical, 
psychological, social, luck etc. 
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Feature Supportive Evidence Critical Evidence Commentary 
Expert performance has little 
connection with hereditary ‘gifts’ or 
‘talents’ – ‘experts are not born, 
they are made’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Though there is evidence linking genetic 
endowments to certain, gross general 
traits (e.g. intelligence Bouchard 
(1997)), the refinement of these traits 
into domain specific abilities (e.g. 
pattern recognition, strategic thinking) 
only occurs after years of intense 
training (Baker, Horton, Robertson-
Wilson, & Wall, 2003; Ericsson, 2007). 
 Researchers have found no reliable 
differences between static, physical 
capacities such as visual acuity, reaction 
time, or memory in predicting expertise, 
but have found differences in learned, 
domain specific, information processing 
strategies (Baker, Horton, et al., 2003) 
 A high quantity and quality of deliberate 
practice is sufficient to account for 
sporting excellence (Ericsson, et al., 
1993) 
 
 
 Environment only explanations of 
expertise development make the 
assumption that everyone has the genes 
necessary for the acquisition of 
expertise.  This notion of ‘genotypic 
equivalency’ does not fit with basic 
evolutionary or genetic theory 
grounded in the necessity of genetic 
variability for promoting natural 
selection over time (Davids & Baker, 
2007) 
 Unitary explanations of behaviour in 
terms of, for examples, genes or 
environment, fundamentally 
misunderstand human development 
processes (Rutter, 2006) 
 Human development is a complex 
interactional/emergent interplay of 
multiple causal factors – genetic, 
neurological, cognitive, 
environmental/social/cultural etc. (e.g. 
Lewontin, 2000; Noble, 2008; Rutter, 
2006; Tallis, 2011) 
 Almost all biologists (irrespective of 
their favoured frameworks and 
perspectives e.g. Steven Pinker (2002) 
favours genetic explanations) agree that 
it makes little sense to dichotomise 
nature and nurture (Al-Khalili, 2011) 
(see also Baker & Horton, 2004). 
 The multi-causal and emergent 
characteristics of sporting development 
including to elite have been 
proposed/recognised in a sporting 
context (e.g. Baker & Horton, 2004; 
Hackfort, 2006; Johnson & Tenenbaum, 
2006; Simonton, 1999; Singer & Janelle, 
1999) 
 From a practical perspective, research 
 Ericsson and colleagues seek to 
understand the characteristics and 
factors which determine expertise.  In 
doing this they adopt a model of science 
which emphasises atomistic reductive 
explanations and readily measurable 
empirical evidence - mainly quantitative 
measurement.  Thus, when Ericsson and 
colleagues ask the question ‘what are 
the factors which determine expertise’ 
they are limiting their options a priori 
(before the fact) to atomistic 
explanations which can be (more) easily 
measured.  This means, for example, if 
there is no convincing (quantitative) 
evidence for hereditary factors, and 
there is evidence for experience and 
practice then it must be one rather than 
the other (see Ericsson, et al., 1993 p. 
365) 
 As Rutter and others have convincingly 
argued the assumptions implied by this 
model of science are highly 
questionable.  Human development is 
the product of multiple causal forces 
which interact in a continuous cycle of 
inputs, emergent properties, outputs, 
feedback loops, inputs, emergent 
properties and so on.   Thus, the 
assumption that we can pick out single 
factor explanations – e.g. practice 
components - within this dynamic 
process fundamentally misunderstands 
how humans develop  
 The problem for researchers is the 
difficulty of undertaking  measurement 
of, for example, gene-environment 
interactions. Instead, researchers like 
Ericsson and colleagues measure what 
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Feature Supportive Evidence Critical Evidence Commentary 
Expert performance has little 
connection with hereditary ‘gifts’ or 
‘talents’ – ‘experts are not born, 
they are made’ (continued…) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
with coaches suggests that they believe 
there is a role for talent in performance 
development, but that even the most 
talented prospects must practice hard 
to succeed (Starkes, et al., 1996) 
 Some sports researchers make bolder 
claims about the role of genetic 
inheritance in expertise development.  
For example, Sternberg  (1996) suggests 
that ‘talented’ (e.g. genetically gifted) 
individuals see larger benefits from the 
same amount of practice.  Those 
benefiting less from practice would be 
more likely to be discouraged and 
reduce their practice and eventually 
discontinue their engagement.  This 
process would lead to more talented 
individuals persisting with high levels of 
practice in a domain and thus creating a 
false impression that increased practice 
was the primary cause of superior 
performance.  Baker & Horton (2004, p. 
218) make a similar point: “there is no 
conclusive evidence indicating that 
training is the only factor.  It is likely 
that innate predispositions facilitate the 
completion of required amounts of 
training.  For example, an athlete with a 
genotype allowing them to complete 
large amounts of high intensity training 
without suffering injury may be at an 
advantage over an athlete with a less 
resilient makeup.  However, upon 
examination it would appear that 
training was the distinguishing factor 
between the two athletes” 
 Some still favour Galton’s original 
hypothesis that though experience and 
practice are important for improving 
they can i.e. environmental influences 
or practice histories and suggest this 
provides a sufficient explanation.  This is 
just bad science.  If the results of the 
work were not so morally and ethically 
agreeable – then it is likely they would 
provoke as much controversy as gene 
only explanations 
 Arguments such as ‘no early indicators 
of success’ do not preclude a 
genetic/biological influence on 
performance – the initial and continued 
capacity to adapt to and utilise practice 
may well be influenced greatly by 
hereditary factors 
 A very useful overview of the 
complexities of this issue is provided by 
Howe, Davidson, & Sloboda (1998) and 
notably the responses from a number of 
eminent thinkers.  See also the review 
by Baker and Horton (2004) 
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Feature Supportive Evidence Critical Evidence Commentary 
Expert performance has little 
connection with hereditary ‘gifts’ or 
‘talents’ – ‘experts are not born, 
they are made’ (continued…) 
 
performance they are ‘genetically’ fixed 
to a certain level above which the 
individual cannot move 
 Interestingly, Ericsson and colleagues 
acknowledge that individuals may differ 
in predisposition to engage in hard work 
or motivational qualities.  As Simonton 
suggests, although it usual to think of 
performance improvement having a 
significant cognitive component it could 
equally emerge from “dispositional 
attributes, such as unusual energy and 
special interests which maintain the 
intensity and focus of the required 
learning and practice” (Simonton, 1999, 
p. 436).  For example, Horsburg, 
Schermer, Veselka, & Vernon (2009) 
suggest that mental toughness has a 
genetic component 
 Baker and Horton (2004) provide a 
useful overview of the psychological 
characteristics necessary to ‘get there’ 
as well as ‘be there’.  See also Holt & 
Dunn (2004) for an exploration of 
psychological factors supporting success 
in football 
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Feature Supportive Evidence Critical Evidence Commentary 
The development of expertise 
requires an extended period of 
deliberate practice – over 10 years, 
or 10,000 hours 
There is a monotonic (straight-line) 
relationship between deliberate 
practice and expertise (Ericsson, et 
al., 1993) based on the power law of 
practice (Anderson, 1983; Newell & 
Rosenbloom, 1981) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The link between the development of 
expertise and time spent on practice is 
“one of the most robust relationships 
ever identified in behavioural science” 
(Baker, et al., 2009, p. 78) 
 The relationship has been established 
through, for example, the work of 
Simon & Chase (1973) in chess (who 
first used the expression ’10 year rule’), 
Bloom (1985) retrospective 
developmental histories of talented 
performers in multiple domains 
 A review of the evidence across 
domains is provided by Ericsson et al. 
(1993, p.366) 
 However, Ericsson suggests that simply 
practising the activities of a domain is a 
weak predictor of performance  - 
however, 10,000 hours of deliberate 
practice is a strong predictor (Ericsson, 
et al., 1993) 
 Expert violinists accumulated 7,410 
hours of practice over 10 years, 
compared to 5,301 hours for good 
violinists.  Expert pianists accumulated 
7,606 hours of practice over 10 years, 
compared to 6,000 for amateur 
counterparts (Ericsson, et al., 1993) 
 In sport, a connection has been 
established between the number of 
practice hours (deliberate practice) and 
expertise (e.g. Baker, Côté, & 
Abernethy, 2003a, 2003b; Baker, et al., 
2005; Helsen, et al., 2000; Helsen, et al., 
1998; Hodges & Starkes, 1996; Mischel, 
1973; Starkes, et al., 1996).  The number 
of hours accumulated varies 
considerably by study and sport.  For 
example, in Helsen, et al. (1998) 
 Ericsson and colleagues’ methodology 
emphasises development components 
which have a high statistical correlation 
with outcomes e.g. practice.  Therefore, 
this approach tends to simplify or ignore 
other valuable developmental 
components (Cobley & Baker, 2010) 
 Baker (2007) suggests (deliberate) 
practice is a necessary condition of 
expert performance (i.e. it has to be in 
place for expertise to be developed), 
but it is not a sufficient condition (i.e. it 
guarantees expert performance) 
 Crust (2010) suggests it is too simplistic 
to suggest that performance 
improvements occur only through 
deliberate practice as ‘narrowly’ defined 
by Ericsson and colleagues e.g. team 
sport practice involves more than 
solitary practice  
 Baker, Côté, & Abernethy (2003a) 
suggest that different types of practice 
structure might suit different activities 
e.g. matt and ice work with a coach in 
wrestling and ice-skating, solo practice 
and private lessons for musicians 
 Cobley and Baker (2010) suggest a 
diverse range of practice activities 
(beyond deliberate practice) can 
account for Ben Hogan’s expertise 
 Berry, Abernethy & Côté (2008, p. 686) 
suggest “a number of activities that 
appear pivotal to the development of 
sport expertise do not constitute 
deliberate practice” 
 Baker, Côté, et al., (2003b) suggest a 
wide range of informal, relatively 
unstructured sport activities featured in 
the development histories of experts in 
 A common feature in the performance 
development and coaching literature is 
to treat domains (e.g. sports), sessions, 
goals and other contextual factors as if 
there is one factor underpinning 
performance development.  For 
example, Ericsson and colleagues 
emphasise the importance of deliberate 
practice.  Others recommend other 
practice structures and coaching 
arrangements.  The reality of 
performance improvement and training 
is that goals and contexts vary 
considerable in and between sessions 
(North, Muir, Duffy, & Lyle, 2011).  
Therefore, the environments and 
activities (practice structure and 
coaching) will need to change to reflect 
this.  This kind of nuanced approach to 
practice and coaching is more a rarity in 
the literature than the mainstream – 
though there are exceptions (e.g. 
Abraham & Collins, 2011) 
 Though it is difficult to argue with 
Ericsson and colleagues’ views on the 
quantity of practice, it is perhaps 
remarkable that such a high profile 
approach, with such a rich research 
history and vast publication 
background, could so infrequently refer 
to, or reference, wider literatures in 
relation to the qualities of 
developmental experiences.  For 
example, human development 
processes (e.g. Rutter, 2006), learning 
theories (e.g. Schunk, 2012)  and skills 
acquisition theories (A. M. Williams & 
Hodges, 2004) 
 
17 
 
Feature Supportive Evidence Critical Evidence Commentary 
The development of expertise 
requires an extended period of 
deliberate practice – over 10 years, 
or 10,000 hours (continued)… 
 
international soccer players had 
accumulated 4587 practice hours after 
10 years, and 6328 practice hours after 
13 years.  International hockey players 
had accumulated 8541 practice hours 
after 10 years, and 10,237 practice 
hours after 13 years 
 Jenkins (2010) suggests there is 
considerable support for deliberate 
practice in the developmental history of 
golfer Ben Hogan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
teams sports 
 There are other learning and 
development theories which account 
for the evidence e.g. Paquette and Roy 
(2010) use Moon (e.g. 2004) to look at 
Ben Hogan 
 Observing others, engaging in 
spontaneous fun, and incidental and 
implicit learning may all contribute to 
expertise development (Berry, et al., 
2008) 
 In many team sports experience of 
competition is seen as ‘pivotal’ to 
expertise development (Baker, Côté, et 
al., 2003a; Starkes, et al., 1996) 
 Baker et al. (2005) suggest, using 
research from ultra-endurance 
triathletes, that the relationship 
between sport specific practice is not 
monotonic, but non-liner, or a power 
relationship (Newell & Rosenbloom, 
1981) 
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Feature Supportive Evidence Critical Evidence Commentary 
Practice should focus on goal 
directed domain specific activities 
that are highly relevant to 
performance/focus on weaknesses 
 
Note: as indicated earlier, Ericsson and 
colleagues have softened their view on the 
importance of ‘deliberate practice’ and 
‘deliberate play’ in expertise development 
(e.g. Ericsson, 2007).  However, reflecting 
their original position, we shall present the 
evidence for deliberate practice in the 
‘Supportive Evidence’ column, and any other 
evidence in the ‘Critical Evidence’ column. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Jenkins (2010) suggests there is 
considerable support for focusing on 
weaknesses in the developmental 
history of golfer Ben Hogan 
 Baker, Côté & Deakin (2005) suggest 
sport specific training consistently 
differentiates experts and non-experts 
in later stages of development 
 There is evidence for structured practice 
activities discriminating between 
decision-making abilities in AFL (Berry, 
et al., 2008) 
 The amount of sport specific structured 
practice activities (batting practice) 
differentiated high and low 
performance cricketers (Ford, et al., 
2010; Weissenteiner, et al., 2008) 
 Côté & Hay (2002) suggest that children 
– aged 6-12 years should engage in 
informal, unstructured, fun, enjoyment 
and play or ‘deliberate play’ (if in an 
organised sport setting) where they can 
modify rules, with only minimal 
emphasis on skill development, and that 
this has no detrimental impact on their 
development into elite performers (see 
also Côté, Baker & Abernethy (2007). 
Support is provided by Côté (1999), 
Sloberlak & Côté (2003) amongst many 
others… 
 There is significant recent evidence for 
the role of play in expertise 
development (when combined with 
sport specific practice) in UK football 
(Ford, Ward, Hodges, & Williams, 2009; 
A. M. Williams, et al., 2011) 
 Research by Greco, Memmert, & 
Morales (2010) suggests that deliberate 
play training programmes have a 
positive impact on tactical intelligence 
(awareness and ability to implement 
existing tactical approaches) and tactical 
creativity (the ability to develop new 
tactics and approaches) 
 Deliberate practice and unstructured 
play-like involvement both have crucial 
roles for the development of creative 
behaviour in basketball, handball, field 
hockey, and soccer (Memmert, et al., 
2010, p. 9) 
 Deliberate practice and deliberate play 
(in the sampling years) discriminate 
between decision-making abilities in AFL 
(Berry, et al., 2008) 
 Participation in a diverse range of 
activities including deliberate practice 
 There is evidence to support both 
activities which focus on addressing 
specific weaknesses, and more general 
(playful) practice.  The relevance of 
these activities will be determined by 
the context – goals, athlete histories, 
developmental stage and so on 
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Feature Supportive Evidence Critical Evidence Commentary 
Practice should focus on goal 
directed domain specific activities 
that are highly relevant to 
performance/focus on weaknesses 
(continued)… 
can contribute to improving 
performance (Cobley & Baker, 2010) 
 To improve footballing performance, 
players undertake a variety of forms of 
training, all of which are believed to be 
relevant to the improvement of their 
overall individual and/or team 
performance.  Cross training (i.e., 
training using other sports or activities) 
is routinely used to improve 
physiological conditioning whereas skills 
training is typically done in a very sport 
specific manner (Baker, Côté, et al., 
2003a) 
 Research on elite Canadian figure 
skating found that athletes often 
focused a disproportionate amount of 
time practicing activities with which 
they were very familiar (Deakin & 
Cobley, 2003)  
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Feature Supportive Evidence Critical Evidence Commentary 
Practice should be 
active/effortful/mindful/sustained 
concentration and attention; it is not 
inherently enjoyable/motivating; 
and does not lead to immediate 
social or financial rewards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Experience alone is not a good predictor 
of expert performance (Ericsson, et al., 
1993) 
 Left to their own motivations/devices 
performers often find very inefficient 
methods of practice (Ericsson, et al., 
1993) 
 Practice needs to be motivated, 
effortful, not enjoyable, structured, 
focusing on addressing weaknesses, 
with knowledge of results, and effective 
feedback (Ericsson, et al., 1993) 
 Jenkins (2010) suggests there is 
considerable support for sustained 
concentration and practice beyond 
fatigue in the developmental history of 
golfer Ben Hogan 
 The Theory of Deliberate Practice does 
not take sufficient account of the 
influence of incidental/tacit learning 
(e.g. Cianciolo, Matthew, Sternberg, & 
Wagner, 2006) 
 Csikszentmihalyi (1990) suggests that 
there are states of individual 
engagement in an activity – referred to 
as ‘flow – which have some similarities 
with deliberate practice e.g. absorption, 
concentration, but are more 
unconscious, absorbed, fulfilling and 
enjoyable, and they can lead to 
improved performance (Nakamura & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2002) 
 Though generally supporting the 
deliberate practice framework, Jenkins 
(2010) suggests – using the 
developmental history of golfer Ben 
Hogan - that though practice was hard 
work it was also inherently enjoyable 
and (personally) rewarding 
 Research on elite Canadian figure 
skating found that athletes rated 
relevant and effortful activities as 
enjoyable (Deakin & Cobley, 2003)  
 Other research has highlighted the fun 
elements of practice (Côté, 1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 There are concerns about the way in 
which Ericsson et al. (1993) use 
evidence to support the notion of 
deliberate practice as the key to 
performance improvement 
 The initial arguments focus on a number 
of oppositional qualities e.g. ‘there is no 
support for inherited talents in expert 
performance’; ‘there is weak evidence 
for the impact of experience on 
performance’; ‘it is not work or play’; 
‘therefore it must be a form of practice 
that provides advantage’ 
 Then a series of arguments are made 
about the qualities of practice that 
experts engage in e.g. it is effortful and 
not enjoyable because it involves 
prolonged engagement in mindful, 
boring and fatiguing activities.  Practice 
often involves, is facilitated by, 
important others.  These, and other, 
factors are then built into the composite 
(monolithic) structure viz. deliberate 
practice 
 Thus, Ericsson and colleagues discount 
‘other evidence’, are left with practice 
activities, look at those practice 
activities, find they have commonalities 
(especially in music) and suggest these 
practice characteristics are the sole 
contributors to expertise 
 But what about the discounted 
evidence admitted by other 
frameworks? What about the tacit/non-
measurable facets of expertise 
development? What about the other 
activities and contingencies which 
contribute to the overall engagement in 
the sport?  Again, it is bad science to 
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Feature Supportive Evidence Critical Evidence Commentary 
Practice should be 
active/effortful/mindful/sustained 
concentration and attention; it is not 
inherently enjoyable/motivating; 
and does not lead to immediate 
social or financial rewards 
(continued)… 
 
conclude that the most common 
measurable practice activities in, for 
example, expert music development are 
the sole contributors of expertise 
development 
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Feature Supportive Evidence Critical Evidence Commentary 
Practice should have appropriate 
feedback from self (through 
observation/comparison) or high 
quality coach or mentor 
(challenging, critical, perhaps even 
painful); and opportunities for 
corrective adjustment 
 
Note: as indicated earlier, Ericsson and 
colleagues originally emphasised the solitary 
nature of deliberate practice as opposed to 
practice with team mates, or with a 
coach/mentor/facilitator.  This has changed 
slightly in recent representations of their 
ideas (e.g. Ericsson, 2007).  This point made, 
and whilst recognising that their ideas have 
changed, we shall present the evidence for 
solitary practice in the ‘Supportive Evidence’ 
column, and any other evidence in the 
‘Critical Evidence’ column. 
 
 Knowledge of results and appropriate 
feedback are a precondition of efficient 
learning (Ericsson, et al., 1993) 
 Jenkins (2010) suggests there is 
considerable support for solitary 
practice in the developmental history of 
golfer Ben Hogan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Solitary practice may work in solitary 
pursuits such as music, chess and golf, 
but it is much more difficult to 
understand how it will work in team 
activities (Cobley & Baker, 2010). 
 Performance in team sports is 
dependent upon the cohesive 
interaction among members of the 
sports team unit, thereby necessitating 
training as a group in addition to 
training alone (Baker, Côté, et al., 
2003b) 
 Team practice was one of the greatest 
contributors to expertise development 
in football (as well as greater levels of 
motivation, dedication and perceived 
competence in the early years,  
influential parents and the associated 
support structure) (Ward, et al., 2007) 
 Bloom (1985) and Carlson (1988) 
highlight the importance of family, 
peers and coaches in developmental 
processes (Ericsson et al. (1993) argue 
that these stakeholders encourage 
individuals who show early promise to 
engage in deliberate practice) 
 Deakin and Cobley (2003) suggest for 
elite Canadian volleyball players, the 
coach was instrumental of structuring 
and maintaining the amount and 
intensity of (deliberate) practice 
 Rutt-Leas & Chi (1993) suggest that the 
quality of instruction was an important 
factor in understanding the differences 
between expert and non-expert 
swimmers 
 Holt, Ward & Willhead (2006) highlight 
coaching approaches in soccer 
 
 Solitary, team based, and coach/mentor 
facilitated ‘corrective adjustments’ are 
all likely to confer benefits for expertise 
development.  Much depends on the 
goal and the context 
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Feature Supportive Evidence Critical Evidence Commentary 
Since performance peaks at 
particular ages – 20s, 30s, 40s 
(depending on the domain (Lehman, 
1953) – some domains require very 
early focused engagement including  
volume and intensity of specialised 
training, opportunities to engage in 
elite development structures, with 
access to superior training resources 
and supportive environments 
 Ericsson et al. (1993) suggest engaging 
in deliberate practice at an earlier age 
provides an opportunity to accumulate 
more practice hours which leads to 
higher levels of performance 
 These individuals also attract more 
supporting resources from an earlier 
age which means it is more difficult for 
late starters to catch-up 
 Ericsson et al. (1993) present evidence 
from music and chess to highlight the 
early starting age of expert performers – 
typically in the range from 5 to 10 years 
old 
 Helsen, et al. (1998) suggest that elite 
soccer players generally start playing 
the sport at 5 years old 
 Ward et al. (2007) suggests early playful 
activities and early diversification do not 
discriminate between experts and 
novices in football 
 Re-evaluating Ward et al. (2007), Ford, 
Ward, Hodges, & Williams (2009) 
suggest that early diversification does 
not discriminate between experts and 
novices in football 
 There are some physical and 
psychological reasons to support early 
specialisation in gymnastics (North, 
2011) 
 
 
 
 
 Côté & Hay (2002) suggest early 
diversification that focuses on fun, 
enjoyment and development of early 
competence using a variety of playful 
sporting activities leads to intrinsic 
motivation which leads to (and certainly 
doesn’t detract from) sporting expertise 
 Baker, Côté, & Abernethy (2003a) 
suggest that a greater breadth of initial 
sporting experiences, for example, in 
other sports, provides ancillary benefits 
which mean that less deliberate, 
domain specific practice are required 
for athletes to achieve national team 
status 
 Baker & Côté (2006) suggest early 
diversification in sports may stimulate 
physiological and cognitive adaptations 
which lay the groundwork for 
specialised and cognitive capacities 
necessary for later expertise 
 Combined cumulative, or even 
multiplicative effects of diverse practice 
could account for expert performance.  
In this scenario, all or a blend of 
activities across a given period of time, 
above and beyond those defined as 
deliberate practice, would predict skill 
improvement (Cobley and Baker, 2010). 
 Motor skill development research 
supports the notion of an early focus on 
fundamental movement skills in early 
childhood to more specific sport-specific 
skills in adolescence and early 
adulthood (Seefeldt, 1980; 1982) 
 Based on sports participation trends in 
elite athletes, early specialisation is not 
an essential component of elite athlete 
development.  For example, elite 
 Discussions of the strengths and 
weaknesses of early specialisation are 
complex and multi-layered 
 There is little doubt that if an individual 
decides to specialise in a domain/sport 
at an early age, and has the right kind of 
development experiences, this provides 
significant opportunities for 
performance improvement which may 
confer advantages over late starters.  
However, whether this early 
engagement leads to expert 
status/winning at the highest level is 
hostage to a range of other factors e.g. 
ability, support, injuries/burnout and 
luck 
 Côté and various colleagues have 
consistently argued that early 
specialisation is not required for expert 
performance in many sports and that it 
is not worth, therefore, the risk of 
associated disadvantages 
 We would suggest that simple 
arguments for and against early 
specialisation miss many important 
physical, psychological and social factors 
which pertain to particular 
sports/contexts.  In some 
sports/contexts early specialisation 
might be appropriate/desirable, in 
others not.  Much of the data might also 
be skewed by opportunities/cultures of 
early diversification and sampling in 
individual countries (e.g. it is less 
available/acceptable to sample multiple 
sport in Liverpool in England, than it is 
in Kingston, Canada, or Brisbane, 
Australia) 
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Feature Supportive Evidence Critical Evidence Commentary 
athletes often engaging in a number of 
other sports (Baker, et al., 2005; 
Carlson, 1988; Côté, 1999; Hill, 1993; 
Soberlak & Côté, 2003) 
 Early specialisation is associated with a 
range of negative consequences in sport 
– risk of injury, delayed maturation, 
decreased enjoyment, pressure to win, 
vulnerability, low self-confidence and 
self-esteem, compromised social 
development, eating disorders, burn-
out and drop out (for a comprehensive 
review see Baker, et al., 2009) 
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Some Conclusions and Implications 
Ericsson and colleagues ‘10,000 hour rule’ and ‘Theory of Deliberate Practice’ has made a 
considerable contribution to research and practice whilst at the same time being simplistic and 
partial. 
In the following bullets we will try to capture some of the main strengths and weaknesses of this 
body of work. 
Strengths 
1. Ericsson and colleagues’ work highlights the importance of extensive practice (in terms of 
numbers of hours/years) to performance/talent development and the acquisition of expertise.  
Though this idea was developed through previous research - notably Simon and Chase (1973) and 
Newell and Rosenbloom (1981) - Ericsson’s work has provided this (simple but powerful) idea with 
increased research support and public profile.  In doing this, their work has challenged, discredited, 
and perhaps even buried an hereditary ‘talent’ (only) view of expertise 
o In the domain of sport, at least, the hereditary view has been viewed as wasteful, 
notably, in terms of early selection, and implications for later participation 
2. Ericsson and colleagues’ work has also focused attention of the qualities of practice, notably, the 
importance of conscious, deliberative, intentional improvement, and how expertise is mediated 
through cognitive mechanisms.  In doing this, it has stimulated a wider debate about the 
mechanisms which facilitate the development of expert performance 
3. Ericsson and colleagues’ work has had significant influence on research, policy, practice and 
popular thought 
o There is a significant research programme which has both supported and critiqued 
Ericsson and colleagues’ work which has provided considerable and evolving insight into 
the nature of expert performance and how it develops 
o Through Ericsson and colleague’s publications, external profile, and the work of aligned 
popular scientific writers (e.g. Gladwell & Syed), an important political and social 
message about individual responsibility and empowerment has come to widespread 
attention 
o Agencies, such as sports governing bodies, have changed their thinking and practices as 
a result of the influence of Ericsson and colleagues 
4. It has also provided some useful methodological insights. 
Weaknesses 
1. Though the quantity of practice is a necessary condition of expertise development, practitioners 
should not be distracted by absolute figures such as 10 years, or 10,000 hours.  The latter should be 
seen as little more than a metaphor for extensive practice in a domain 
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2. The Theory of Deliberate practice is far too simplistic and one-dimensional to account for 
expertise development 
o There are multiple causal forces - hereditary and environmental - which interact 
emergently through human (including expertise) development.  These interactions are 
very complex perhaps even impossible to capture (as a result of the length of causal 
chains and associated feedback loops) 
o A range of practice experiences - including but not limited to deliberate practice – 
influence and underpin expertise development, this includes: in domain, out of domain 
(especially for early development experiences and creativity)/play and practice 
o The practice experiences of individuals wishing to achieve expert status will vary 
considerably between contexts – domains/sports, goals, environmental and 
spatial/temporal considerations.  There is no one solution – potential ‘best fits’ depend 
on performance goals and context 
3. Ericsson and colleagues’ utilise specific disciplinary, philosophical and methodological 
assumptions which are increasingly challenged 
o Ericsson and colleagues’ work is largely situated in the discipline of cognitive psychology  
– thus there is a significant emphasis on the ideas and methods of cognitive psychology 
at the expense of other influences (physical, social) and disciplinary approaches 
o Ericsson and colleagues’ research philosophy – an (extreme) variant of positivistic 
scientism – has been extensively and perhaps fatally critiqued in the philosophy of social 
science literature (Sayer, 1984; M. Williams, 2000) 
o Notably, Ericsson and colleagues’ deployment of ideas around ‘objectivity’ and reliance 
on reductive quantitative methods lack sensitivity to the subjective, hidden and tacit 
influence of expertise and expertise development 
o It is these philosophical and methodological assumptions, it is argued, that produce such 
a narrow simple view of expertise and its development.  In other words, the uncritical 
adoption of a particular research philosophy and method determines to a large degree 
how Ericsson and colleagues define and measure expertise which, in turn, influences 
their views on how it is developed.  It is inevitable that if you define expertise in a 
particular way – observable reproducible objective performance behaviours – that you 
get a very mechanistic view of learning and development 
o These philosophical and methodological assumptions also lead to an over confidence 
about findings, a tendency towards over generalisation, and lack of nuance and 
contextual detail in accounts 
o Ericsson and colleagues’ work makes very little reference to research and practice from 
highly related domains in human development, learning theory and skills acquisition 
o Ericsson and colleagues adopt a verificationist model of science rather than one based 
on refutation (Popper, 1935/1959).  For example, Ericsson & Lee (2010) reject evidence 
that does not fit with their model on ‘fun and enjoyment in practice’ and ‘daily practice 
duration’.  Those who are more critical make apologies for their ‘iconoclasm’ (e.g. 
Abernethy, et al., 2003)! 
o At its extreme, their work is selective in its referencing and treatment of data to ‘prove’ 
the case 
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Implications for Coaches 
This review suggests the following implications for coaches: 
1. There is no ‘single theory’ solution to expertise development 
o The Theory of Deliberate Practice is just one of many theories about how human’s 
develop and improve.  Theories are our latest ‘informed best guesses’ about the way in 
which the world and it human inhabitants are shaped and structured.  Other theories 
make other informed best guesses which emphasis different findings and 
recommendations 
2. For coaches, a crucial consideration is deciding which ideas/theories to apply against athlete goals 
and contextual considerations 
o Ideas/theories can come from experience, from other coaches, and from academic 
articles.  All have strengths and weaknesses, the key is deciding which one to use, with 
who, when and why 
3. That said, the review does point to some clear implications for coaches: 
o The quantity of practice is one of the most reliable indicators of expertise development 
o Training/practice should be structured according to the goals, players, and context – this 
means the use of many different practice activities both across and during sessions 
o Practice that involves players consciously engaging and focusing on weaknesses is likely 
to be beneficial to their development 
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